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JANE EVANS GARLAND, AN INFANT, ETC., 
v. 
NORFOLK NATIONAL BANK OF COMMERCE 
AND TRUSTS, ETC. 
FROM THE CilWUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK. 
"'rhe briefs shall be printed in type not less in size than 
small pica, and shall be nine inches in length and six inches 
in width, so as to conform in dimensions to the printed 
records along with which they are to be bound, in accord-
ance with Act of Assembly, approved March 1, 1903; and 
the clerks of this court are directed not to receive or :file a 
brief not conforming in all respects to the aforementioned 
requirements.'' 
The foregoing is printed in small pica type for the infor-
mation of counsel 
H. STEvV ART JONES, Clerk. 
IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals· of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
JANE EVANS GARLAND, AN INFANT, ETC., "\VHO 
SUES BY HER NEXT FRIEND, M·YRA V. FRIEBUS, 
Appelhint, 
v. 
NORFOLK NATIONAL BANK OF COMMERCE .AND 
TRUSTS, OF NORFOLK, VIRGINIA, A UORPOR1\-. 
TION DULY CHARTERED UNDER THE LAWS 0], 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; L .. F. BRUCE, 
AND THE SEABOARD CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK 
OF NORFOLK, ,VIRGINIA, A CORPORATION DULY 
. CHARTERED UNDER THE LAWS OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA, GUARDIAN OF JANE EVANS 
GARLAND, Appellee. 
To the Honorable Judges of the Supretne Court of Appeal.c; 
of Vir.qinia: 
Your petitioner, Jane Evans Garland, an infant under the 
age of twenty-one years, who sues herein bv her next friend, 
Myra V. Friebus, respectfully shows unto the Court that she 
is aggrieved by a decree of the Circuit Court of the City of 
Norfolk, Virginia, entered on the 14th day of Decemb~r. 
1929, in the chancery cause pending in said Court wherein 
your petitioner was the complainant, and L. F. Bruce, and 
others were defendants, whereby a demurrer fil~d by L. F. 
Bruce to the bill of your petitioner in said cause was sus. 
tained and said bill dismissed. A transcript of the record iu 
said case is herewith filed, and from it will appear the fol- · 
lowing facts : 
FACTS. 
Petitioner filed her bill afore,said, in the Court aforesaid, 
alleging her infancy, that she was the daughter of L. F. 
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Bruce, was about eighteen years of age, and was married, 
and living in the City of Washington with her husband; that 
at various times, during the years preceding her marriage, 
she had received gifts of small amounts of money from vari-
iou~ kinspeople, which she had handed to her father to be 
deposited in a savings account in the Norfolk National Bank 
of Commerce and Trusts of Norfolk,- Virginia; that her fa-
ther, the said L. F. Bruce, had deposited the same in said 
Bank in the name of L. F. Bruce "for Jane Evans Bruce" 
-that is the petitioner, or ear marking it and identifying 
it in some other way as belonging to the petitioner; that the 
amount in said saving·s account was approixm.ately $910.00, 
and that the bank book evidencing the same was in the pos-
session of L. F. B·ruce, her father ; that she had applied to 
L. F. Bruce for said bank book, and requested that she be 
allowed to draw the amount to her credit in said Bank, but 
he refused to accede to her request, and insisted on keeping 
the amount so deposited under his control by means of the 
savings account just mentioned; that she had other property 
in the hands of the Seaboard Citizens National Bank of Nor-
folk, Virginia, which is her guardian, from which she is re-
ceiving $112.50 per month, under order of the Court; that 
she was the equitable owner of the savings account afore-
said, and was entitled to have her ownership in the same de-
clared and protected; that there was in the hands of her 
g·uardian, separate from this sum, $26,000.00 in money, and 
.that she was entitled to a vested interest of the value of 
more than $50,000.00 in the remainder of certain property 
in which her g-randmother, a lady of nearly eighty years of 
age had a life interest; that she was unable to live accord-
ing to her station in life on the amount of the income which 
was being paid her, and that she needed this savings ac-
count for certain necessary purposes set forth in said bill; 
that she was entitled to it at any rate, because it was a sav-
ings account, and of that kind of property of which infants 
have the absolute personal control. She prayed in said bill 
that her ownership of said deposit might be established, and 
that the Bank in which it was. deposited might be decreed 
to pay the same over to her direct. To this bill she made 
the Norfolk National Bank of Commerce and Trusts, of Nor-
folk, Virginia, where the money was deposited, the Seaboard 
Citizens National Bank of N o.rfolk, Virginia, her guardian, 
and L. F. Bruce, her father, co-defendants,-they being all 
of the parties interested in said suit by even the remotest 
possibility. . 
None of the parties defendant appeared to said bill, ex-
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cept L. F. Bruce, who filed a demurrer on the following 
grounds: 
1. That it appears on the face or" said bill of complaint 
that the fund which is sought to be recovered by the infant 
complainant is in excess of an amount which a court may or-
der paid directly to an infant without the intervention of a 
reeciver or guardian appointed for said infant. 
2. Tha.t it appears on the face of said bill that the said 
fund which is sought to be recovered, even in the event the 
Court should hold that the infant complainant is now the 
owner of the same, is principal and not income and the in-
fant is not entitled to have any portion of the same deliv-
ered directly to her. 
3. That this proceeding is contrary to the statute in such 
cases made and provided whereby a court may authorize and 
empower the guardian of an infant to expend funds for the 
benefit of their beneficiary beyond the annual income de-
rived from the ward's estate. • 
4. The bill of complaint shows on its face that the said 
· complaint shows on its face that the said complainant is a 
minor and married and that she is seeking to obtain the con-
trol and management of an estate, contrary to the law in such 
cases made and provided.'' 
It was this demurrer that the Court below sustained by 
the decree aforesaid, and dismissed petitioner's bill. 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR. 
Your petitioner assigns as error the action of said Court in 
sustaining said demurrer and dismissing her bill. 
QUESTION OF LAW. 
The only question in the case is whether equity has juris-
diction under the facts set out i~ said bill, and that it has, 
on the several grounds following, would seem manifest: 
(a) 
Certainly equity has jurisdiction to establish and declare 
in your petitioner the ownership of the deposit mentioned in 
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said bill, and protect the same, in a suit in which ;Bruce, who 
made the deposit; the Bank, which held the deposit, and peti-
tioner's legally qualified guardian were parties. Indeed, 
such ownership in .such a deposit could only be declared and 
protected in a court of equity. In Tiffany on Banks and 
Banking, pp. 49-50, it is said: 
''Although the relation between the bank and its depositor 
is merely that of debtor and creditor, and the balance due 
on !hP ~.cc.ount is a debt to the depositor, the question is al-
ways open: To whom in equity does it beneficially belong? 
If the money deposited was that of a third person, and was 
held by the depositor in a fiduciary capacity, the equitable 
owner may assert his right to the deposit. The contract 
created. by the deposit being between the bank and the de-
positor, the remedy of the person equitably entitled is in 
equity." 
'ro sustain this text, many cases are cited, amongst them 
being, Union 8toak-Ya1·ds N a.t. B(lln.k v. Gillespie, 137 U. S. 
117; and Nolting Y. Na.t,iona.l Bank of Virginiw, 99 Va. 54. 
In the last cited case, our Court observed as to a deposit: 
''Even were the beneficial interest wholly in another, it is 
doubtful whether he can maintain an action at la'v for the 
money." Cases might be multiplied to the effect that only 
in a court of equity is there jurisdiction in such cases. No 
authority to the· contrary has been found, and it is submitted 
that none can be found. 
Assuredly, the ownership of this fund being in the infant, 
she had a right to sue by her next friend to have that owner-
ship declared and protected, regardless of whether she had 
a guardian or not. This is fixed by what your petitioner be-
lieves is the shortest section of the Code of Virginia, Section 
5351, which provides: 
''Any minor entitled to sue may do so by his next friend.'' 
The West Virginia Court, in LaJWson v. Kirchner, 40 S. 
E. 344, holds : 
"Where a debt or demand is payable to infants, a suit 
therefor is properly brought in their names, by their next 
friend. although the money when recovered goes to their 
guardian. ' ' 
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In this case, the guardian of your petitioner was a party 
to the suit, and if, as a means towards protecting and es-
tablishing the ownership of the property in your petitioner, 
the Court thought it ought to be paid over to the guardian, 
it was easy enough to so decree. Certainly, the Conrr had 
jurisdiction· over the whole matter, and could decree the fund 
to be paid to either the guardian, or, as will be shown here-
inafter, to your petitioner direct. 
It is to be carefully noted that not one of the grounds as-
signed for the demurrer at all questioned the jurisdiction of 
equity as to this phase of the matter, which was not a matter 
that could be overlooked by the· Trial Court, for it was dis-
tinctly and clearly brought to its attention, and relied on by 
your petitioner. Jurisdiction of equity on the above ground 
was clear, and the Court err~d in dismissing the bill. 
(b) 
There is yet another phase of this case, which was brought 
to the attention of the Trial Court, although with little ef-
fect: lt is to l·e noted that the deposit sought to be recovered 
by the infant in this suit was made up of sums of money 
which had been given to her directly, by various kinspeople, 
during her young life, and which her father had deposited 
to his own credit, though ear marking it as belonging to the 
petitioner. As to such a deposit, and the moneys therein, it 
seems well established that an infant is entitled to personally 
control the same, and to draw out and expend it as she sees 
fit. If it had been in the Bank in her own name, the Bank 
could have safely paid it to her. If her father had been ·of 
a more generous nature, and less hard and harsh, he might, 
with safety~ have paid it over, and she could never thereafter 
have questioned such payments. All of this is becaus·e of the 
peculiar nature of this property. :which distinguishes it from 
other property of an infant. It was your petitioner's sav-
ings account that was ·involved, and it has been continuously 
recog·nized as her savings account. 
The case of S'malley v. The Central Trust Co., Inc. (Ind ) , 
125 N. E. 789, i::; apl·opos here,-the Court saying therein: 
· ''We do not by this decision .disturb the general rules of 
]a,v as to the validity of contracts of minors. 'Ve do hold, 
however, that where a minor is in lawful possession of money 
as her own property: whether from the proceeds of settle-
ment with her guardian, as compensation for services ren-
6 f:;upreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
dered, or from any other lawful source, and puts it in bank, 
or other place of safekeeping, rather than carry it on her 
person, she has a right to reclaim it at any time, even though 
she is yet a minor. And the person or institution so paying 
it to her assumes no risk in so ~oing. '' 
Of course, in this view of the la,v, it makes no difference 
whether the minor personally places the money in the bank 
to her credit, or whether she delivers it to another person 
to be placed there to her credit. She has a right in this case 
to claim it, not only from the Bank, but from her father, 
and he would be fully protected in paying it over to her dur-
ing her non age. 
At any rate, plaintiff had a right, in this same suit, brought 
to establish and protect her interest and ownership in this 
deposit, and to which her general guardian was a party, to 
have it determined in the course of that suit whether this 
money should be paid directly to her general g·uardian, and 
the general guardian would be bound by any decision in it 
on that question. 
(c) 
Petitioner now c01nes to the only ground of equity juris-
diction whieh is at all questioned by the reasons assigned 
for the demurrer. It has been shown that the demurrer, and 
the reasons assigned therefor, do not at all touch upon or 
affect the two grounds of equity jurisdiction hereinabove 
Het out; and, of course, this being the case, and the juris-
diction on both of those hvo grounds being well established, 
it was error to sustain the demurrer and· dismiss the bill on 
the basis that jurisdiction did not exist on the third ground 
also, to which only the reasons assigned for the demurrer 
related. 
But it is now proposed by your petitioner to go further 
and demonstrate that the third ground of equity jurisdiction 
iR just as well established as the first two grounds, and that 
the Court erred in sustaining the demurrer, even to that 
third ground. of equity juirisdiction, as to which alone the 
reasons assigned for the demurrer related. 
Aside from w~at has been said under (a) and (b), equity 
plainly had jurisdiction in this case on the ground of its gen-
eral jurisdiction over infants' estates. The protection of in-
fants, and of infants' property has, from time immemorial, 
been a. favorite ground of equity jurisdiction. As said by 
,Justice Story, in his Equity Jurisprudence (10 Ed.), Vol. 
II, §1337: 
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''But whatever may be the true origin of the jurisdic-
tion of the Court of Chancery over the persons and prop-
erty of infants, it is now conceded on all sides, to be firmly 
established and beyond the reach of controversy.'' 
And, it is to be noted that that jurisdiction, even in the 
respect of appointing guardians, is not taken a'vay from them 
by. modern statutes. D'ltrrett v. DaviS!, 24 Gratt. 302, 314-
315. 
The equity court had jurisdiction, not only to establish and 
protect petitioner's ownership of the deposit aforesaid on 
the ground that she was the equitable owner thereof, but 
also on the ground that she was an infant, and that her 
property and herself were peculiarly subject to, and entitled 
to invoke the equity jurisdiction of the Court. Not only is 
this true~ but ahvays, as soon as any suit is brought in an 
equity court involving an infant's property, and is depend-
ing therein, the infant becomes, and has always been, re-
garded as a ward of the court, and chancery has always ex-
ercised jurisdiction over such property involved in such 
pending suit, and over the person of the infant. Upon mere 
petition, in such suits, it has made allowances out of the cor-
pus of the "personal estate'' belonging to the infant. and 
directed expenditures beyond the income of the infal.lt '-s prop-
erty, in proper cases. And it has never been doubted tha-t 
an equity court, upon a bill brought for that purpose, had a 
right to m·ake such orders, even if the infant had a gener~l 
guardian, although it was for a time doubted whether such 
expenditure would be ordered on a 1nere petition to a chan-
cery court in a pending suit where there existed a general 
guardian. 
In Vol. II, Story's Equity Jurisprudence (10 Ed.), §1354, 
it is said: 
'''Vhenever the infant is a ward of chancery, and a suit 
is depending in the court, the court will, of course, upon 
petition, direct a suitable maintenance for the infant, upon 
ing a due regard to the rank, the future expectations, the 
intended profes~ion or employment, and the prope:vty of the 
latter. But, where there is already a guardian in existence, 
not det··ivin.g his a1tthority front the Cou.rt of Chancery, ancl 
where there is no suit i·n the cmtrt touching the infant or his 
property ( thu.s m,aking the infant qu,asi a ward of the court), 
there fo1·merly existed much difficulty, on the part of the 
coud·t, i·n infe1'{ering upon the petition, either of the guardiatt 
o1· of the infant, to d'irect a suitable 1na-intenance of the latter. 
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The effect of this doubt ~vas to allow the gJ-tardian to exercise 
his discretion at his own peril; and tluts to leave much to his 
sense of duty, a;nd 'much 'lno're to his habits of bold or of timid 
action in ass'lnning responsibiilty At present, a dif-
ferent course is pursued; and, in ordinary cases, at least 
where the p1~0tJerty is small, the court will, up·on petition, 
without requiring the 1nore formal proceeding by bil;l, settle 
a due maintenance upon the infant.'' 
From this it is plain that when the ward is a ward of chan-' 
eery, the Court has always assumed jurisdiction to make or-
ders respecting his maintenance, and, further, that he be-
comes a ward of chancery whenever a suit is pending in a 
chancery court involving any part of his estate. See Story, su-
pra, and 31 Corpus Juris, p. 1035, §97. 
It is further plain from this quotation that, when the 
infant has a guardian, and when he is not even technically 
a ward of chancery because "·there is no suit in the CO'ltrt 
touchin,q the infant or his property", the chancery court 
would, on mere petition of the infoot, make such an order 
''where the property is small'', and '' witho'ltt requiring the 
'more for,mal tJroceed·ing by bill". This last quotation e~­
phasizes the fact that even where there is a guardi~n,-and 
no wardship in chancery, i. e., no suit pending touehing the 
infant's property,-there is no doubt that a formal bill in 
chancery will lie. 
Ground 1, of the demurrer, invokes Acts of 1928, pp. 13-
14,-but it is perfectly plain that that Act has nothing to 
do with the question involved in his suit. It was simply 
meant to provide for the payment of a fund directly to an 
infant-without the appointment of a guardian, and where 
there is no guardian, when the amount does not exceed 
$500.00. The intent of the Act is to save the. expense of a 
g·uardianship where the estate the infant is entitled to is 
$500 00, or less. and the infant is mature enough to justify 
payment directly to her. It wa.s not intended to af!eot the 
power of a court of equ.ity to order expendit'ltres beyond the 
inc01ne f'ront the corpus of the· pe'rsona.Z estate8 · of the 
infant, so as to enable the infant to live according to its sta-
tion in life . 
. Ground 2, of of the demurrer, is that a court of chancery 
l1as no right, in authorizing expenditures from the corpus 
of the per.sonal e-state b~yond the income, to order the moneys 
for that purpose to be paid directly to the infant. A mo-
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ment's reflection will show that (this position is not tenable. 
It is not to be expected that a guardian, in supporting 
and maintaining h_is ward, is to make personally every ex-
penditure that is made for that purpose. For instance, the 
Seaboard Citizens National Bank of Norfolk, or any other 
fiduciary company, with its innumerable guardianships, could 
not see to every detailed expenditure made in the support 
and maintenance of a ward; and where the ward has arrived 
at years of discretion, it is allowable· for the guardian to 
turn over to him directly moneys to be used for his support 
and maintenance, and the guardian will be allowed such ex-
penditures in his account. In a note to 18 Am. State Reports, 
at p. 650, this is made plain by a quotation from the South 
Carolina Court in Rivers v. Gregg, 5 Rich. Eq. 274: 
"It is a fallacy to suppose that a distinction can be drawn 
between the case where an infant is actually supplied with 
the necessaries themselves, and that where he receives an 
allowance under an order of the court, which he is to disburse 
himself in their purchase. If it be urged that the infant may 
'vaste 9r misapply his allowance, and thus be reduced to a 
state of destitution that would require his necessary wants 
to be otherwiHe supplied, it is obvious that the argument ap-
plies with equal force to the case where the infant is sup-
plied with the necessary articles for his use and con-
sumption. These he may sell, give away, or waste, so that 
it may become necessary that he should have more, to save 
him from nakedness and starvation. '' 
Again, the guardian should be allowed reasonable discre-
tion in the matter of advancing to a ward money for per-
sonal expensess. Carner v. Va,il,. 56 Ind. 542, 544. 
Where the circumstances and the fortunes of the ward 
warrant it, traveling expenses may be allowed, which, of 
course, may be handed ·personally to the ward. A reason-
able expenditure for a ward's trousseau may be handed to a· 
ward of the age of discretion : A ndersO'Ii v. Silcox ( S. C..), 
63 S. E. 128. 
Not only is this true, but a Court of Equity always has 
jurisdiction over an infant's estate and authority to order 
payments therefrom, or to order the guardian to pay to the 
ward a certain amount, and, in a suit such as this, the Court 
would not do the futile thing of ordering the guardian first 
to coHect the money and then turn it over to the ward, thus 
incurring more expense to the 'vard 's estate, but will put the 
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saddle on the right horse at once and order the payment to 
be made directly to the vlard. 
Ground 3 of the demurrer, is iri substance, that the only 
way expenditures beyond income from personal estate can 
be authorized to be made by a guardian is. under Section 
5321 of the Code, where provision is made for such authori-
zation 'l.tpon the petition of the guardioo. But the court of 
chancery has been authorizing such expenditures from time 
immemorial, and this Section has not precluded the Court 
from still exercising that jurisdiction ·but is merely a cumula-
tive procedure. See D1~rrett 'V. Davis, supra. In addition 
to this, such expenditures under such statute can .only be 
made if the guardian sees fit to file such a petition as is 
therein contemplated, and, if the court of chancery did not 
still possess the jurisdiction to authorize such allowance on 
the petition of the infant herself, the effect would be, as 
stated in the quotation from Story, hereinabove: 
''to allow the guardian to exercise his discretion at his own 
peril; and thus to leave much to his sense of duty, and much 
more to his habits of bold or of timid action in assuming 
responsibility.'' 
It was never intended that an infant should be placed 
entirely in the hands of its guardian as to expenditures, with-
out any remedy at all unless the guardian chose at his own 
'vhim and wish to file such a petition as is provided in Sec-
tion 5321. 
Ground 4 of of the demurrer is not good, because the bill 
does not show such facts as are therein stated to be shown, 
but quite the contrary. 
Of course, 'vhat has been said above, as to the jurisdic-
tion of equity to auo,v expenditures beyond income, a.p-
. plies solely to the pe'rsonal estate of the infant,-which is the 
nature of the property here involved,-a.nd has no applica-
tion to allowing maintenance out of the corpus of the real 
estate, as to which the procedure is wholly statutory. The 
distinction is pointed out in lless v. Hess, 108 .Va. 483. 
AS TO THE EXPENDITURES REQUESTED. 
vVhether the Trial Court should, in this particular case, 
authorize the expenditures is not before· tl1is Court, and was 
not before the Trial Court, because of the dismissal of the 
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bill on the demurrer; and, of course, can only be deter-
mined by the Trial Court after this case has been reversed_ 
and sent back to it for further procedure. But, it should be 
noted that to turn this money into. the guardian's hands first, 
and then afte;rwards to turn it baek to the infant, would en-
tail a cost to the infant of 5%, or $45.50, in commissions. 
A FURTHER OBSERVATION. 
And, lastly, it is to be doubted whether the father of your 
petitioner, who contributes now, because of her marriage, 
not one cent to her support, who is not required by law to 
s~pport her, and who is not her guardian, has any standing 
in a court of equity to resist the payment by him to her of 
moneys which are in his hands individually, and not as her 
guardian, belonging to her; and, in addition to this, to go fur-
ther and resist an application by her to be allo,ved to use 
those moneys in her necessary support. He is the only de-
fendant who made an appearance in the case, and already 
has put his daughter to some cost, and 'vill put her to more 
expenses in this matter. When this case is reversed, it should 
be at his individual cost and expense, and she should recover 
from him her costs. 
COPY OF PETITION DELIVERED. 
Before this petition for an appeal is presented to a Judge 
of this Court, in vacation, or to this Court, in Term, or filed 
with the Clerk of this Court, a copy thereof was delivered to 
opposing counsel in the Trial Court, such delivery being made 
on the 20th day of December,.1929; and, if opposing counsel 
sh~ll answer this petition, counsel for petitioner desires to 
state orally the reasons for reviewing the decree herein com-
plained of, unless the Court, or the Judge, receiving this pe-
tition thinks petitioner ought to have an appeal without such 
oral argument being necessary. 
CONCLUSION. 
Your petitioner, therefore, prays that an appeal, without 
supersedeas, may be allowed her from the decree of the 14th 
day of December, 1929, herein complained of, and that, inas-
much as it is perfectly plain that no damage can result to 
anybody by such an appeal, a.nd that petitioner will have to 
pay in advance all of the costs of this ,Court in printing, etc.., 
that only a nominal bond be required of her; that the decree 
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afo1 esaid may be reviewed and reversed, and this snit re-
manded to the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk, Virginia, 
with the direction to that Court to proceed ·with the further: 
hearing of this cause. · 
Appellant adopts this petition as her brief. 
All of which is respectfully submitted. 
JANE EVANS GARLAND, 
By MYRA V. FRIEBUS, 
Her next friend. 
By NATH'L T. GREEN, Counsel. 
NATH'L T. GREEN, p. q . 
• 
I~ Nathaniel T. Green, an attorney .practising in th~ Su-
preme Court of Appeals of Virginia, do hereby certify that, 
in my opinion, the decree complained of in the foregoing 
petition is erroneous and should be reviewed and reversed. 
Given under my hand this 20th day of December, 1929. 
NATH'L T. GREEN, 
Rec 'd Dec. 21, 1929. 
. H.·s. J 
Appeal and supet·sedeas awarded. Bond $250. 
Feb. 19/30. 
E. W. HUDGINS. 
, Received Feb. 20/30. 
H. S. J. 
TRANSCRIPT OF RECORD. 
:VIRGINIA.: 
Pleas before tJ1c Circuit Court of the City 0f Norfolk, 
at the Courthouse thereof, on Saturday, the fourteenth day 
of December, in the year of our Lord, nineteen hundred 
and twenty-nine, and the one hundred and fifty-fourth year 
of tl1e Commonwealth. 
Re It Remembered, That heretofore, to-,vit: In the Clerk's 
' Office of the Circuit Court aforesaid, came the complainant, 
Jane Evans Garland, an infant, etc., who sues by her friend, 
J. Garland, etc., v. Norfolk N. B. o! C. & T., etc. 13 
Myra V. Friebus, and filed at the Rules holden for said Court 
on the Third :Nionda.y in October, 1929, her bill in c.hancery 
against }{ orfolk National Bank of Commerce and Trusts, of 
Norfolk, Virginia, a corporation duly chartered under the 
laws of the United States of America; L. F. Bruce, and The 
Seaboard Citizens National Bank of Norfolk, Va., ·a corpo-
ration duly chartered under the laws of the United States of 
America., Guardian of ,T ane Evans Garland, defendants, in 
the following words and figures: 
To th~ Honorable Allan R. Hanckel, Judge of the Circuit 
Court of the City of Norfolk, Virginia: 
Humbly complaining, your oratrix Jane Evans Garland, 
an infant under the age of tw~nty-one years, who sues herein 
by her next friend, l\tiyra V. Friebus, shows unto your Honor 
the facts following: 
page 2 ~ 1. That the said Jane Evans Garland is an in-
fant, of about eighteen years of age, or more, and 
is the daughter of the defendant herein, L. F. Bruce; that 
she is married and lives with her husband, one J er·ome Gar-
land, in the City of Washington, D. C. 
2. That at various times during the years preceding her 
mflrriage certain gjfts of small amounts of money were made 
to your oratrix from sundry of her kinspeople which her 
father, the said IJ. F. Bruce, deposited in a savings account 
in 'vhat was then the National Bank of Commerce of Norfolk, 
N' otfolk, Virginia, but which is now known as the Norfolk 
· N" a tiona] Bank of Commerce and Tn1sts, of Norfolk, Vir-
ginia; said deposits being made, as your oratrix is advised, 
in the name of L. F. B'ruce ''For J a.ne Evans Bruce'', or in 
.some other way which earmarks and identifies said deposit 
as belonging to your oratrix; and that, as aforesaid, said 
savings account is now with the Norfolk National Bank of 
Commeree and Tn1sts of Norfolk, ~Virginia, and amounts, 
as your oratrix i$ advised, to $910.00,-the bank book evi-
dencing said deposit being now, as your oratrix is advised, 
1 in the possession and under the control of said L. F. Bruce, 
the father of your oratrix. 
3. That your oratrix has applied to her father, the said 
L. F. Bruce, for said savings bank book, and has requested 
that she be allowed to withdraw the amount so to her credit 
in the Bank aforesaid, but her father refuses to accede to 
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her request in this respect, and insists on. keeping the ·said 
fund, deposited as aforesaid, under his own con-
page 3 ~ trol by means of the savings account just men-
tioned. 
4. That your oratrix has other property which was be-
queathed he.r ·by her grandfather, the la:te Mr. John Vaughall;, 
which· said other property is in the hands of her guardian,. 
duly appointed by the Court as such, said guardian being 
the d.efendant herein, The Seaboard Citizens National Bank 
of Norfolk, Virginia, and from the income on the funds so 
in the hands of said guardian there is now being paid to 
your oratrix towards her support under the order of this 
Court, the sum of $112.50 per month. 
5. That your oratrix is advised that she. being the equita-
ble owner of the savings account aforesaid and designated 
on the face thereof as such, the Norfolk National Bank of 
Commerce and Trusts of Norfolk, Virginia, can safely pay 
over to her, on her own orde.r or check, the funds on deposit 
with it as aforesaid, but this the said Bank is unwilling to 
do unless an order of the Court to that effect is entered in 
a proper proceeding, .such as this, to which, not only said 
Bank, but L. F. Bruce, the father of your oratrix, and The 
Seaboard Citizens National Bank of Norfolk, Virginia, her 
guardian, are also parties. 
6. That your oratrix is in need of said money in order to 
supply herself with necessaries suitable to her station in 
life, and to furnish, in part, a home where she may reside 
'with those comforts to which, by reason of her means, she is 
entitled; and, in this connection, your oratrix shows unto 
your Honor that her guardian has is· its hands money belong-
ing to her amounting- to $26,000.00; and that she is 
page 4 ~ also entitled to a vested interest in remainder in 
certain other property in which her grandmother, 
the widow of the late John Vaughan, has a life interest, which 
amounts to over $50,000.00, and, with the~e resources, your 
oratrix believes she is entitled to the enjoyment of such nec-
essaries and comforts as can be obtained by the paying over 
to her the amount of said savings account, in addition to the 
$112 50 a month now being· paid her under the order of this 
Court by her guardian. 
In Tender Consideration Whereof, and for as much as 
your oratrix is remediless save in a court of equity wherein 
" 
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alone such matters are cognizable, your oratrix prays that 
the Norfolk National Bank of Commerce and Trusts of Nor-
folk, Virginia, a corporation duly chartered under the laws 
of the United States of America; L. F. Bruce, and The Sea-
board Citizens National Bank of Norfolk, ,Virginia, a corpo-
ration duly chartered under the laws of the United States 
of America, guardian of Jane Evans Garland, may be made 
parties defendant to this bill and required to answer the 
same, answers under oath being hereby expressly waived; 
that your oratrix's ownership of the savings account afore-
said in said Norfolk National Bank of Commerce and Trusts 
of Norfolk, Virginia, may be declared and established ; that, 
if necessary~ the said L. F. Bruce may be required to sur-
rendel' the· bank book evidencing said savings account, and 
that tl113 Nor·folk National Bank of Commerce and Trusts of 
Norfolk, Virginia, may be directed to pay over to your ora-
trix, and into her own hands directly, without the interven-
tion of her guardian, the amount of said savings 
page 5 ~ aceount; that the amount of the same may be ascer-
tained, and, if necessary, that the said Norfolk Na-
tional Bank of Commerce and Trusts of Norfolk, Virginia, 
may, in the meantime, be restrained from paying over said 
account to the said L. F. Bruce, or any other person; that a. 
proper allowance may be made to your oratrix's counsel for 
his services in this suit, and that such other, further and 
general relief may be granted to your oratrix as to equity 
may seem meed and the nature of her case may require. 
And she will ever pray. 
JANE EVANS GARLAND, 
By ·MYRA V. F~EBUS, 
Her Next Friend, 
By NATH'L T. GREEN, Counsel. 
NATH'L T~ GR.EEN, p. q. 
And thereupon the said defendants having ·been duly sum-
moned and having failed to appear, plead, answer or demur 
a decree nisi was entered against them them as the Rules. 
And at another day, to-wit: In the Clerk's Office afore-
said, at the Rules holden for said Court on the first 1\'Ion-
day in November, 1929, the defendants, Norfolk National 
Bank of Commerce and Trusts. and The Seaboard Citizens 
National Bank, having still failed to appear, plead, answe-r 
. of demur the bill was taken as confessed as to them and 
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set for hearing; and the defendant, L. F. Bruce, 
page 6 ~ appeared at said Rule and filed herein his demur-
. rer to the Complainant's Bill, and the said cause 
was set for hearing on said demurrer. Said demurrer of L. 
F. Bruce, being as follows : 
DE~IURRER OF L. F. BRUCE. 
The said defendant, L. F. Bruce, says that the bill of com-
plaint herein filed is not sufficient in law, and states the 
grounds of demurrer relied on to be as follows: 
1. That it appears on the face of said hill of complaint 
that the fund which is sought to be recovered by the infant 
complainant is in excess of an amount which a court may 
order paid directly to an infant without the intervention of a 
receiver or guardian appointed for said infant. 
2. That it appears on the face of said bill that the said 
fnnd which is soug·ht to be recovered, even in the event the 
Oourt should hold that the infant complainant is now the 
owner of the same, is principal and not inc~me and the in-
fant iR not entitled to have any portion of the same deliv-
~red directly to her. 
3. That this proceeding is contrary to the statute in such 
cases made and provided whereby a court may authorize 
and empower the guardian of an infant to expend funds 
for the benefit of their beneficiary beyond the annual income 
derived from the ward's esate. 
4. The bill. of complaint shows on its face that the said 
·complainant is a minor and married and that she is seeking 
to obtain the control and management of an estate, 
page 7 ~ contrary to the law in such cases made and pro-
vided. 
TAZEWELL TAYLOR, Jr., p. d. 
And now at this day, to-wit: In the Circuit Court afore-
said, on the 14th day of December, 1929, the day and year 
first herein above written : 
This cause came on this day to be heard on- the bill of com-
plaint filed h~rein and the demurrer of L. F. B-ruce, one of 
the defendants, and the grounds of said demurrer duly fil~d 
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an the joiner of complainant in said demurrer, and the same 
was argued by counsel. 
On consideration whereof, the Court being of the opin-
ion that there is no equity in said bill, doth therefore ad-
judge, order and decree that said demurrer be and the same 
l1ereby is sustained and the bill of ·complaint dismissed at 
the costs of the complainant, an the cause removed from the 
docket of this Court. 
page 8 ~ Virginia: 
In the Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court of the 
City of Norfolk, on the 17th day of December, in the year 
1929. 
I, Cecil M. Robertson, Clerk of the aforesaid Court, hereby 
certify that the foregoing transcript includes the papers :filed 
and the proceedings had thereon in th.e case of Jane Evans 
Garland, an infant, etc., who sues by her next friend, Myra 
1V. Friebus against Norfolk National Bank of Commerce and 
Trusts, of Norfolk, Virginia, a corporation etc., L. F. Bruce. 
and The Seaboard Citizens National Bank of Norfolk, Va., 
a corporation, lately pending in our said court. 
I further certify that the same was not made up anq com-
pleted and delivered, until the defendants had received due 
notice thereof a.nd of the intention of the plaintiff to appeal 
to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia from the final 
decreee herein. · 
Teste: 
·CECIL M. ROBERTSON, Clerk, 
By EDW. W. BREEDEN, Jr., D. ·0. 
Fe~ for transcript $9.50. 
A Copy-Teste : 
H. STEW ART JONES, C. C. 
INDEX 
Page 
Petition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
Record ................................................ 12 
Bill ........................ ·~ ......................... 13 
Demttrrer. . . . .............. ! •••••••••••••••••••••••• 16 
Decree ...................... · ......................... 17 
Certificate. . . . ............ ·: ......................... . 11· 
